Essay on "Strategy: How Relevant Is Counterinsurgency Doctrine"

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Past Experiences

America's experiences with counterinsurgency have not been very successful and have been replete with painful memories of its experiences in Vietnam. In fact, one of the first detailed examinations by the U.S. Army severely criticized the counterinsurgency doctrine followed in Vietnam. This study also stated that the army had forgotten the lessons learnt in Vietnam, should have rectified its lack of ability to carry out counterinsurgency operations and should have closely studied low-intensity conflicts in order to map its strategies and conduct. Despite the fact that the history of the defense forces in the U.S. is filled with numerous experiences of unconventional conflicts, the U.S. is still more interested in the study of a conventional war in the European-style. (Cassidy, 2006, p. 119)

However, the global war on terror which the U.S. has pursued since September 2001 is not a normal kind of war but a counterinsurgency against global insurgency. Al-Qaeda and other insurgents have adapted to all the advantages offered by modern terror techniques and globalization. To counter the challenges posed by these insurgents, a military transformation preceded by a military cultural change is required. The present-day insurgency has similarities with the revolutionary guerilla war of the 20th century like the hit-and-run tactics but has some vital differences as well. This hybrid form of insurgency is still evolving and is basically a strategy of the weak. Consequently, military cultural change, interagency coordination and change in doctrine must be seriously considered by the United States. (Cassidy, 2006, p. 119)

The Iraq war has demonstrated that a full-blown war may not serve the purpose of improving the global security situation and may, in fact, even worsen it. The war in Iraq turned out to be an excellent training ground for insurgents from all over the Muslim world who would be able to apply the lessons learnt during this stage to instigate terrorism in their own respective zones once they returned. This war also damaged diplomatic relations of the U.S. with many of its allies in Europe. Thus, it becomes essential to apply broad counterinsurgency doctrines instead of blindly employing past counterinsurgency tactics to combat the global terror forces. (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 113)

It has been seen that when a counterinsurgency strategy is an out-and-out military exercise requiring overwhelming force and violent measures that affect not just the insurgents but the population as well, the immediate effect in many cases is a suppression of violence and insurgency. However, the root problems remain unaddressed and continuous suppression becomes a part of the counterinsurgency operations resulting in long-term social and political repercussions. On the other hand, when counterinsurgency operations are focused on providing long-term solutions and establishing peace in the region by addressing the root causes of the insurgency, the effect has been widespread and more effective since the problems that caused the insurgency were removed. Therefore, successful counterinsurgency strategies involve meeting the insurgents' demands or accepting the causes that they are fighting for without subjugating to their illegitimate methods. (Moore, The Basics of counterinsurgency)

European Experience and the 4 Principles of COIN

European nations, particularly Britain, have enjoyed far more success in counterinsurgency operations than the U.S. During the "counterinsurgency era' approximately from 1945 to 1970, European countries faced a multitude of insurgencies from nations opposing colonial rule. Britain developed successful counterinsurgency techniques which they implemented in various regions of its colonies like the Malaysia known as Malayan Emergency, Oman Dhofar campaign and Northern Ireland in the period between 1919 and 1960. (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 117)

The U.S. would stand to gain by emulating the four broad principles of counterinsurgency that Britain employed to successfully target insurgency. These four principles include: (i) Winning the hearts and minds of the local people by pursuing economic and/or political reforms, (ii) initiating and maintaining a close cooperation between the police, military and civil government, (iii) employing force or violence selectively to target insurgents without inflicting undue harm and damage to innocent locals and in the process alienating them, (iv) allowing the command and control of operations to be decentralized and giving more independence to the civilians, military and police in fighting the insurgents within their local jurisdiction. (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 117)

However, it must be emphasized that the worldwide terror campaign unleashed by the huge decentralized network of terrorists as exemplified by the likes of al-Qaeda is significantly different from the insurgency perpetrated in a particular region or country. Therefore, studying the particulars of COIN operations conducted in past campaigns with a view to applying them in current specific insurgency scenarios would be futile. On the other hand, application of the above-mentioned 4 COIN principles in combination with effective tactics might help in achieving much better outcomes than the strategies employed in the current global war on terrorism. There is no doubt that counterinsurgency is one of the only relevant methods left to combat the nature and scale of global insurgency being witnessed today, but the way to go about it must be carefully and humanely chosen and "strategized" in order to achieve the basic goal of establishing world peace and rooting out terrorism. (Mockaitis, 2007, p. 118)

Ethics of Counterinsurgency

According to the Human Rights Watch annual report of 2003, the war on terrorism that the Bush administration had waged had absolutely no regard for human rights. This report had maintained that human rights had been considered dispensable on the pretext of fighting terrorism. In fact, the aggression employed in COIN operations in the GWOT have been considered as a more "globally dangerous policy" than the ones used during the Cold War era. The Bush administration had gone as far as stating that "aggression is the national policy of the United States." (Gareau, 2004, p. 190)

The COIN operations had been conducted so far without any regard for international accountability and have been rather clumsy. It is the motive of the Washington government that is questionable rather than the general use of counterinsurgency doctrines to contain global terror. According to many, the events of 9/11 provided a rare opportunity for the U.S. government to use the pretext of the global concern for security in the wake of terrorism to pursue its "factional neo-Reaganite agenda" -- a legacy of the Cold War. (Mamdani, 2007, p. 231); (Gorka, 2008)

In order to restore the legitimacy and credibility of the U.S. government, it must not give way to immoral and illegal tactics. The U.S. must ensure that appropriate and proportionate violence is used only when required and as a last resort only and the targets should be legitimate ones that do not involve civilian casualties. The U.S. must stop using tactics that dispense with human rights and cast doubt on the moral authority of the nation. A democratic nation must, therefore, act with great responsibility and more display more international accountability than other states. (Amstutz, 2005, p. 163)

Classical Counterinsurgency and New Methods

It has been advocated by many experts that traditional counterterrorism may not be adequate to fight the global war on terrorism and counterinsurgency may provide the only alternative against the worldwide "jihad." Classic counterinsurgency in itself a doctrine with flaws, which developed in the sixties to combat insurgency in a particular country, necessitated methods like long-term commitment to a specific course of action, coordinated military-political responses, and integrated interagency and regional measures. However, these strategies are neither applicable nor can be achieved at the international level in the current scenario. Thus, a comprehensive reappraisal of counterinsurgency doctrines as well as tactics is required that can develop tactics… READ MORE