Research Proposal on "Modernity the Discourse"

Quoted Instructions for "Modernity the Discourse" Assignment:

Please reword this essay, keep the format, keep the thesis and content.

Introduction:

Within the discourse of modernity we find hostility to non-Western cultures that both operate to exclude them from the realm of meaningful participation in the making of the modern world, and simultaneously articulate a desire to whitewash and *****civilize***** them to resemble the West. *****Instrumental in the ideology of colonialism, this configuration continues to wield a powerful influence in contemporary theories of the Orient and of modernity. The assumption of modernity privileges Western cultural and moral dispositions, defining modernity in terms of Western cultures and historical experiences.***** (Mirsepassi, 9) The trope of modernity considers the *****West***** as the embodiment of progress, and views non-Western cultures and traditions as, at best, lagging behind, and at worst hostile to modernity and incompatible with it.

Nineteenth century developments in Iran, as in many other parts of the global south led society to be *****divided into two parts: an elite class, drawn into the cultural orbit of the West through political and economic ties, and the mass of people. The former designated themselves as *****modernized***** and *****Westernized***** while the latter were seen as *****traditional***** and *****backward,***** with this binary corresponding invariably to the divisions between rich and poor, ruler and ruled***** (Mi*****, 25). This blatant elitism was produced and enacted by the Iranian state, under the Pahlavi dynasty, which was itself influenced by imperial ideals of modernization.

The irony of this discursive turn is that the revolution in Iran was fought emphatically for modernity and all of its promises as a social ideal, but also against the distorted version of modernity imposed first under Nasir al-Din Shah and later the Pahlavis which betrayed every humanistic principle modernity was supposed to represent. And yet modernity under the three Shahs *****was no mere deviation or corrupted moment in an otherwise morally pure design; the discrepancy between ideal and reality under the Shahs and the dictators like them is a revelation of the interlocked *****other***** face of modernity***** (Mirsepassi, 17).

To counter the outset of modernity*****s association with the West, nationalism was displayed in the form of a struggle against the absolute monarchy and in quest of a new state imbued with liberalism and progressive ideas without colonial domination. From the beginning of his political career, Muhammad Mussaddiq had come to realize that, although not formally a colony, Iran was dominated by Britain. The British embassy was an effective institutional component of the Iranian polity and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company the main pillar of British domination. *****As an act of his office between 1951 and 1953, Mussaddiq gained great popularity for nationalizing Iran*****s oil industry, wresting from the British invaders one of the final vestiges of its colonial hold***** (Abrahamian, 279). For Mussaddiq, colonialism whether formal or informal brought social decay and was the result of economic and political backwardness. On the other hand, Mussaddiq and others like him were neither frightened of modern ideas and techniques- as was the religious establishment- nor were they mesmerized and captivated by them. Their understanding of Iranians and Europeans societies was rational and realistic; they believed that lasting progress was possible only through methods which would produce a comprehensive as well as a synthetic change. An important aspect of this attitude was their firm belief in freedom, law, and democracy, perhaps even more than technical progress. And this meant that technical and socio-economic progress must involve the people*****s consent, conviction, and co-operation. Inside Iran Mussaddiq*****s memory remained as symbol of independence, and had a certain power as opposition to the Shah and the West came once more to the surface in the 1970s, until it was revolutionized by new ideas and images after the revolution of 1979.

In present day Iran, spokespersons for the Islamic Republic see Iranian *****˜nationalists***** precisely as they were seen in the Mussaddiq era that is as direct descendents of the Democratic and constitutional era. But if there is an acceptance of the nationalists as a group that struggled for Iranian national independence, it is a grudging acceptance. For supporters of the Islamic Republic, their reaction to nationalism is as a secular phenomenon and secular implies a rejection of the divine plan implicit in the Koran for the creation of the good society.

Nationalism and liberalism alike are manifestations of Euro-American culture and hence deserving of total rejection in the view of those supporting Khomeini. Many distinct aspects of modernity became anathema, identifiable most closely with western impropriety and cultural genocide against Islam. And naturally, it would be the increasing importance of the force of Islam, gathered in its strength by a defensiveness its leaders had come to see as necessary, that present day Iran would establish its importance and its identity. This is perhaps best captured by an act which both secured Iran*****s independence in the coming years and which likewise embroiled it in the unending struggle for autonomy.

As a result, the Islamic revolutionary movement of the sixties and seventies should be seen as an attempt to seriously challenge the discourse of modernity. In its own discourse this movement was very much affected by the discourse and phenomenon it set out to challenge. The Islamic discourse can thus be seen as an internal dialogue, with modernity. In its own peculiarly manner, this discourse has not completely abandoned the principles of modernity. There is no doubt that these were great impediment to the development of modernity in Iran. The contradictions it has engendered can be viewed as driving the dynamic search for modernity since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.

The main thesis of my study suggests that Iran*****s experience with modernity should be understood in terms of a process involving aspects of modernity conductive to emancipation and those more conductive to domination. In this dialectical process, different elements of modernity often vied with each other, leading to different phases in the development of the new civilization in Iran. Furthermore, at different times different aspects of modernity were developed and elaborated by different social groups. Thus the early reformist intellectuals of the late nineteenth century, at least in their theoretical approaches, placed more or less equal emphasis on the democratic and positive aspects of modernity, whereas, beginning with the Pahlavi era, the emphasis was shifted to the instrumental side of modern civilizations. In like manner, the Islamic theocrats came to place great emphasis on expanding and deepening the potential for the liberation and empowerment of Iranians in the twentieth century.

Historical Background

Iran*****s encounter with Western modernity began under Nasir al-Din Shah*****s long rule. The onslaught of modernity and European infiltration shook to the core the existing Iranian sense of cultural identity and community. Imperial cultural hegemony was on the rise. Iranian despots were now more often than not in awe of the West; their sense of political security was dependent on the pulse of the Western powers, and not the will of their own people. At great costs, they usually tried to cultivate a modern image of themselves in the eyes of the west. This ambivalence over identity is at the core of the problematic relationship with the Western powers. Whereas, *****xenophobia nationalists and religious fundamentalism harbor narcissistic illusions of ethnic or religious grandeur, some advocates of modernity foster a cult of self-denigration and illusory notions about the perfect West*****¦ On the other hand, all social issues modernity hurls into the public domain were ensnared with colonial politics***** (Mi*****, 25)

In 1872, a British company bought a concession from the Qajar ruler that gave it the exclusive right to run Iranian industries, exploit its farm lands, and mineral resources, develop its urban transportation systems, and establish its national bank and printed currency. *****The British statesman Lord Curzon would call this the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industry resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished in history***** (Kinzer,62). Nasir al-Din Shah sold the majority of Iranian industry to British Imperial for only 15,000 pounds. Under the terms of the arrangement, Iranian tobacco farmers had to sell their crops at prices set by the British Imperial Company, and every smoker had to buy tobacco from a shop that was part of its retail network. By the end of the century, increasing public discontent erupted on a mass scale during the tobacco crisis of 1891-1892. The general strike encouraged by a religious fatwa against the use of tobacco, further spread into a state wide boycott.

Similarly, when Nasir al-Din Shah *****contracted with a Belgian company to construct a rail road from Tehran to the shire of Abdul Azim, cart drivers fearing cheap competition, mullahs opposing foreign influence, and pilgrims shaken by the death of a fellow pilgrim under the steam engine joined hands to tear up the railway***** (Abrahamian, 72). Exploitation of Iranian resources by the West during the second half of the nineteenth century undermined the fragile relationship between the Qajar state and Iranian society.

From 1918 until 1921, *****British subsidies kept the government afloat, and British military and administrative advisers attempted to reorganize Iran*****s army and to manipulate the various political factions within the country to British advantage***** (Cleveland, 185)* When Britain offered to grant Iran a loan in exchange for exclusive advisory privileges, anti-imperial demonstrations broke out in several cities and added to the wide spread discontent with the Qajar government, which was seen as ineffective and pro-British. This chaotic situation was finally brought to an end by the actions of a determined military commander.

In a series of political maneuvers, Reza Khan rose from the position of the commander and chief of the army in 1921 to that of the shah of Iran in 1925 by an election that toppled the Qajar dynasty. As founder of the new Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah vigorously pursued a program of reform designed to create a strong central government. *****To lessen possible opposition, Reza Shah imposed severe restrictions on the clergy and the craft guilds who were by tradition accustomed to considerable autonomy***** (Arasteh, 104)*. In a bold move in 1934, the Shah issued a decree secularizing property, thereby depriving the clergy of its wealth and power. To a large extent civil law replaced Islamic law. Both Islamic nationalist movements and Shiite popular religious practices were outlawed and discredited. The repressive measures of the state restricted civil society and the imposition of a modern state from above, with its violent insertion into daily life, intensified gaps with society. Other acts curtailed public religious expression, particularly pilgrimages to shrines in Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, religious drama and processions associated with the month of Muharram. In a similar way the Shah restricted the activities of the guild by permitting them to meet only if police officers were present.

In a move designed to make modernization a part of daily life, the Shah introduced Western styles of dress for both men and women. The government imposed large quantities of European made clothes and sold them cheaply so that there would be no excuse. The enforced unveiling of Iranian women, as well as the encouragement of men to dress in a Western fashion contributed to gendered and racialized notions subsequent to this forced modernity. *****The authoritarian state imposed through the construction of a coercive public patriarchy based on obedience and loyalty to it as father and king. However, the nation became a site of contestation since it included only those willing to join the project of Westernization and modernization and marginalization those of deviating from it.***** (Kaiwar, 205) The new state developed as an agent of change, implementing and enforcing the agenda of Western modernity through the nationalist elite without the help, and against the wishes, of the ulama, the traditional guilds, and the tribal khans, and incubating a society Europeanized in appearance.

To understand the Iranian revolution, it must first be understood that Iran*****s recent history had continued to be effected by the modernist imperialist narrative. For many decades, the United States enjoyed normalized relation with Iran during Mohammad Reza Pahlavi rule of the Iranian state. However, the Shah*****s decidedly unpopular *****modernization***** projects, the consolidation of an authoritarian state apparatus, the state*****s cultural elitism of the *****Westernized Aryan***** minority and the subsequent massive social upheaval, severely recontextualized the meaning attached to modernization and modernity in Iran. *****This scheme inherently linked *****tradition***** with failure and pointed out a single road to prosperity and power***** (Mirsepassi, 11). The explicit delegitimizing of local culture by an outside invader i.e Western modernity, in turn led the Iranian people toward the singular universality of their own culture and practices, this is especially relevant for our purpose because such a division led to the complete loss of the Shah*****s state power and the ruling class*****s legitimacy in pre-revolutionary Iran.

The systematic suppression of secular opponents created a political vacuum for the emerging Islamic movement, and its attempts to articulate an alternative to oppressive Western models of modernization. The Shah*****s goal was to rebuild Iran in the image of the West or, at any rate, in his own image of the West. He refused to democratize the Iranian polity, and would offer the same response: *****Democracy is the invention of the *****blue-eyed world***** and does not fit the Persian political landscape.***** (Mi*****, 18)

Eventually, perceptions of the Shah*****s inequitable rule were stoked by Muslim clerics, who managed to swell both intellectual and public resentment into a full-fledged revolution. Religious forces bent on halting the march of secular humanism have systematically equated modernity with unsavory colonial and western influences. *****It was precisely this beguiling rhetoric that convinced many secular democrats in Iran that Ayatollah Khomeini was a progressive critic of modernity and colonialism***** (Mi*****, 10).

In this context, new competing and conflicting cultural strategies of selfhood began to emerge. *****Religious forces, suspicious of change, advocated social and spiritual isolation. Only a culture enveloped in divine wisdom, they argued, could survive the satanic verses of modernity. On the opposite extreme were the advocates of cultural transubstantiation who encouraged a total submersion of Iranian culture into the paradise of European civilizations.***** (Mi*****, 52) Confounding this individual battle was the peculiar problem of the new stage of modernity in Iran.

The Occident and the Orient: Looking through the Orientalist Lens

Modernity in the West has frequently been seen as evidence of its cultural superiority, its creativity, thereby its ascendancy over other parts of the world since the era of European colonialism and to the 19th century, especially with regard to the relationship between Western and Eastern culture. *****Ortientalism***** as an academic discipline and a way of thinking emerged as an overarching vision which homogenized non-Western culture and societies. Regardless of any specificity separating the differing people of Asia, East Asia, and North Africa, their commonality according to Orientalist thought, could be found in the fact that they were fundamentally different *****“and inferior to-the West.

This study aims at investigating the representations of Persia in a number of canonical and non-canonical texts. The theoretical framework comes from Edward Said*****s analysis of orientalism. It is argued that the case of Persia instances the heterogeneous and striated character of orientalism (*****˜representations***** rather than *****˜representation***** in the title). It is shown that while a number of relatively similar set of motifs and topoi, mainly derived from classical tradition and contemporary travel writing, circulate in the works of the three authors included (Sheen, Morier, Nasr al Din Shah), they are differently inflected and serve different thematic and ideological purposes.

In what follows I will discuss issues which make Morier*****s Hajji Baba novels the culmination of *****˜oriental tales***** both thematically and stylistically. What makes the Hajji Baba novels masterpieces of orientalist works is above all Morier*****s ability to *****˜pass off***** *****˜partial accounts***** of Persia, which he presumes to have noted during his stay there, (dysfunctional government, social injustice, being out of pace with *****˜modernity*****, etc.) as *****˜the whole story.***** Thus, in England, Hajji Baba, and to some extent the other Persian members of the embassy there, are afforded an *****˜opportunity***** to be educated out of their *****˜oriental***** mode of life and thought: the journey from *****˜ignorance***** to *****˜enlightenment*****, from Persia to England, is both physical and intellectual.

To depict this *****˜darkness***** Morier takes details from Persian life -- cultural *****˜codes***** (*****˜recorded***** in his Journeys) *****“ and dexterously *****˜familiarizes***** them for his readers through the course of the narrative. This *****˜deciphering***** of the then *****˜little known***** Persia informs the orientalist project of the Hajji Baba novels; as orientalism itself presumes to *****˜decipher***** the Orient. Morier*****s art lies in his ability to make this *****˜deciphering***** seem *****˜realistic*****, to *****˜naturalize***** the *****˜Persian***** cultural codes in both senses of making them *****˜known***** (*****˜decoding***** them) and showing that *****˜strange***** though they are, they are *****˜natural***** to the way of life, the mode of thought and behavior, in the (Islamic) East. In other words, these codes become orientalist *****˜coda*****, the final, *****˜conclusive***** remarks on Persian / Oriental life. To give an example, having read the first two pages of Hajji Baba (treating Hajji Baba*****s birth and education), the reader *****˜knows***** something about *****˜kerbelai***** and *****˜hajji***** (and their respective importance), religious education and *****˜Saadi***** and Hafiz being the most popular Persian poets (HB, 1-2). Through the subtle irony that permeates the novel, from the very beginning something of the *****˜moral*****¦darkness***** of the Persian is also implied.

Hajji Baba*****s industrious father neglects his first wife because she is barren *****˜after twenty years***** industry, he found he could afford a second wife to his harem***** (HB, 1). Hajji Baba*****s father undertakes a *****˜pilgrimage to the tomb of Hossein, at Kerbela***** *****˜to get rid, for a while, of the importunities and jealousy of his first wife, and also to acquire the good opinion of his father-in-law (who, although noted for clipping money, and passing it for lawful, affected to be a saint)*****¦ (HB, 1). Motifs such as hypocrisy, self-interestedness and oppression of women *****“ markers of a corrupt society *****“ are harked back to time and again in the novel to the point that they seem quite *****˜natural***** to Persian life.

The Hajji Baba novels champion ideals of rationalism, humanism, defiance of despotism (public and domestic) against the background of *****moral and intellectual darkness which*****¦ overhangs so large a portion of the Asiatic world***** (HB, 14). The Persians become, to use Morier*****s words, *****˜a population of degenerate types***** in his work.

*****One of the most remarkable facts in the modern history of Asia, is the introduction of European discipline in the armies of Persia. When we have seen such discipline entirely destroyed in one Mahomedan state, in spite of the efforts of the government to maintain it *****“ when the prejudices of the Mahomedan religion are considered, and particularly the doctrine of predestination which it inculcates, it must remain a matter of surprise how it has commenced, maintained and strengthened itself in Persia.*****

The above passage demonstrates that his attitude towards this *****˜mission***** is evangelical. It is *****˜a matter of surprise***** that the Persians, the followers of *****˜the Mahomedan religion***** (not Islam), should be able to change at all; they are able to change, to appear European, despite being Muslims.

Hajji Baba depicts the Persians as a degenerate, *****˜picaro***** nation in dire need of European *****˜enlightenment***** and Hajji Baba in England, by contrasting the Persian and the English manners and mode of thought, puts to test the viability of such a project. On his return to Persia from England, in Hajji Baba in England, our eponymy hero has changed so much that we can hardly recognize him as the protagonist of the first novel. In a sense, Hajji Baba could be said to be a *****˜mimic man.***** Morier*****s insistence on depicting the Persian as eager to *****˜mimic*****, to appear European could be likened to Homi K. Bhabha*****s concept of *****˜colonial mimicry***** in his discussion of *****˜colonial discourse*****, with which *****˜orientalist discourse***** at times overlaps, as *****˜the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite.*****

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