Essay on "California Medflies"

Quoted Instructions for "California Medflies" Assignment:

Imagine this hypothetical scenario: you have been hired as a consultant by a non-profit organization to work with the disputants.

You will apply a standard six-step problem-solving approach:

1. Describe the general nature of the problem

2. Describe important facts about the case

3. Identify the decision makers

4. Describe the goals and main concerns of each of the decision makers

5. Describe several possible alternatives (at least five)

6. Evaluate the alternatives and identify the best solution

In addition, as a follow-up to your analysis--

7. Describe possible future monitoring

Write up a report that follows this problem-solving approach.

Remember, this paper is not about your opinions! Each step of the process should be based upon facts from the case. Carefully explain why your recommendations would be better than the other alternatives.

Below is the case study that the essay is to be about. Under that is the teacher's notes on the subject. That is followed by an example of a past paper.

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California Agricultural Trade:

Combating the Medfly Menace

This case study was written by Anne Dawson, Sarah Hassenpflug, James Sloan,

and Izumi Yoshioka with the assistance of Andrew Procassini, D.B.A. Copyrighted by the Center for Trade and Commercial Diplomacy, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, 1998.

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California Agricultural Trade:

Combating the Medfly Menace

Introduction

The medfly poses perhaps the single greatest pest-related threat to California*****s multi-billion dollar agriculture export industry. The pest is responsible for the mass destruction of a wide variety of crops, and continues to plague farmers and growers throughout the world. The threat of the medfly crossing international borders through trade in contaminated agricultural goods has prompted governments to take often-severe measures to prevent such a potential disaster.

The Japanese government has maintained a particularly firm stance with regard to standards and procedures governing the import of produce from countries having any history of medfly appearances. Although California agricultural exports to Japan play a significant economic role on both sides, the Japanese government remains committed to taking trade restrictive actions to reduce the possibility of importing medfly-contaminated products. As the most drastic measure, Japanese officials have indicated that Japan would impose a comprehensive embargo on produce imports from California due to increasing concerns over the presence of the medfly in certain produce-exporting regions. U.S. federal and state officials have responded to the intense foreign and domestic pressures by implementing a number of major control measures designed to rid the California agricultural industry of the menace of the medfly.

Despite the intensity of U.S.-California efforts to combat the pest, the medfly issue remains one of the key problems facing agricultural trade. It has created hostile political divisions among members of the government, farming, and scientific communities. Government officials face pressures from foreign governments and key interest groups, as the medfly continues to etch a lasting place in U.S. agricultural trade history. This case study examines the medfly crisis in California, from its beginnings in 1975, through the tumultuous 80s and 90s, and up to the current status of the issue.

CASE A: THE ORIGIN OF THE MEDFLY CRISIS

Background

The history of California*****s continuing war with the medfly is comparatively short, spanning approximately twenty years to the present. However, the conflict has proven to be extremely expensive and highly controversial in many aspects. The agricultural industry has long played a critical role in California*****s economy, prompting state and federal government officials to take any necessary actions to preserve the continued health of the industry. As the 20th century has progressed, California produce growers have witnessed significant expansion in the market for their agricultural goods. Accordingly, the state farmers have become increasingly dependent on out-of-state revenue sources for their produce. Expansion of California*****s agricultural export industry has included increased exports to other states within the U.S., as well as the opportunity to enter foreign markets such as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. With reductions in some of the traditional trade barriers, and the encouragement and assistance of local, state, and federal governments, California's agricultural producers have recognized the value of the blossoming foreign export industry and have realized significant increases in the amount of exported produce.

While the health of the state agricultural economy has become more closely associated with export revenues, producers have found themselves subject to the product import standards and regulations of the countries receiving California goods. The plant quarantine laws adopted by each individual government determine these rules and standards. In Japan, the government has long had a reputation for implementing particularly stringent regulations on agricultural imports from abroad. The Japanese system is characterized by rigorous product inspection and import clearance procedures aimed at preventing the entry of any perceived agricultural pests and contaminants into the local environment (see Appendix A). Naturally, the Mediterranean fruit fly is categorized as a particularly dangerous exotic pest whose introduction to the Japanese environment could prove highly detrimental to its domestic agricultural industry. Should a medfly infestation ever occur in Japan due to agricultural trade, the occurrence might extract both high economic and political costs. Accordingly, the Japanese government has implemented particularly strict standards with regard to the medfly. Costs are also a consideration for the other side, as Japan has steadily evolved into the largest export market for California producers. This fact, coupled with the likelihood that other East-Asian governments such as Taiwan and South Korea would most likely follow Japan*****s lead in imposing agricultural trade restrictions, makes Japan*****s position on California agriculture and the medfly issue an extremely important one for all parties in the industry.

U.S. state and federal government agencies have responded to the medfly threat by supporting an aggressive program designed to monitor for the presence of the medfly. Officials have further implemented strict plant quarantine measures to contain a medfly problem should one ever be discovered. State and federal agencies maintain an intensive and often controversial eradication program, incorporating the use of potentially risky pesticides such as malathion, to handle any outbreak of the destructive pest. Although the cost of these measures can be enormous, the medfly programs are viewed as essential to the preservation of both the agricultural industry and the general health of certain state economies.

The medfly case has confounded policy makers due to its complexity. California policy makers have been confronted by pressures from the U.S. federal government, individual U.S. state governments, foreign governments (namely the Japanese), public interest groups, the scientific community, various private interest groups, and the domestic agricultural industry. All sides have engaged in strong and frequent dialogues in pursuing their particular interests. These political struggles among the opposing sides have erupted into hostile exchanges in the courtroom and in the media. With the steady increase in inter-state and international trade, the current practices and procedures governing the California medfly issue are the result of these intense foreign and domestic pressures. In the course of addressing the unresolved concerns surrounding the medfly, policy makers will continue to face significant political and economic tension.

The Mediterranean Fruit Fly

As one of the most destructive pests known to the agriculture industry, the medfly can affect over 250 species of fruits, vegetables, and other crops. The medfly prefers fleshy fruits, such as peaches, apricots, and cherries, but may infest virtually any fruit as well as most vegetables raised in California[i]. Female medflies destroy fruit by laying large numbers of fertilized eggs beneath the skin*****s surface of the host fruit or vegetable. The eggs hatch into larvae, which then consume the pulp of the fruit or vegetable. The food product begins to rot, and usually falls to the ground. The larvae then leave the fruit, burrow into the ground, pupate, and finally reemerge as adult medflies (see Appendix B). The entire life cycle may take as little as three weeks during the warm summer months or can be as long as three months during the winter period[ii]. The length of the life cycle varies depending on the temperature of the environment and the exact species of host fruit or vegetable that the pest chooses to infest. These cyclical variations make the medfly a particularly difficult insect to eradicate, as pesticides or other treatments cannot always be precisely timed to have the maximum effect. This results in the necessity for extensive measures to ensure that the pest has truly been contained. In every case, medfly-infested food products are rendered inedible and completely worthless on the market. The scope of destruction can be severe, with some farmers losing their entire crops in a matter of days or weeks.

The medfly is believed to have originated in the tropical climates of Africa. The pest later invaded Europe, parts of the Middle East, South America, Central America and Australia, eventually establishing itself in Hawaii during the first decade of the 20th century. The pest could not be eradicated due to the abundance of potential host crops and the highly favorable climate conditions in the region. Approximately twenty years later, the medfly made its first recorded appearance in the continental U.S. The pest was detected in several counties in the state of Florida. After intense eradication efforts using arsenic-molasses sprays, at an estimated cost of $7.2 million, the pest was officially eliminated by the end of 1930. The pest reappeared in Florida on three separate occasions between 1956 and 1963. The pesticide malathion was used in the ensuing eradication efforts. Texas became the next victim in 1966. Here, malathion was again successfully used to eradicate the pest. By this time, California could only step up monitoring efforts and hope that the medfly would not be found within its borders. The medfly, however, did finally make its first appearance in Los Angeles, California, in 1975 signaling the start of one of the most complex trade cases in California*****s agricultural history.

The Medfly Eradication Program

In anticipation of future medfly discoveries within California's borders, policy makers enacted an eradication program designed to effectively deal with any potential medfly threat. This program consisted entirely of measures to be applied in the areas where medflies would be discovered, and did not include any post-harvest treatment of the affected crops. Once a medfly had been positively identified, government representatives were to declare a state-of-emergency, calling for swift actions to protect the important agricultural industry. Policy makers could readily declare an emergency due to the destructive reputation of the pest, given the fact that the medfly was not a permanently established resident of California. One of the key benefits to the emergency-based approach was that, as an "emergency," state and federal government funds would pay for the ensuing eradication program. Thus, the industry would receive its much-needed protection from the medfly without incurring state costs associated with eradicating the pest.

Once a state-of-emergency had been declared, officials would respond by placing a quarantine over a large area surrounding the actual discovery sight. Under the quarantine rules, no fruit would be allowed to leave the area. In addition, the government would dispatch a ground-based pesticide application force in order to conduct extensive ground spraying using the pesticide malathion. These measures would be accompanied by the release of hundreds of millions of sterile male medflies. These would hopefully mate with adult female flies, rendering the female eggs infertile. It was believed that collectively these measures would effectively eradicate medflies in the affected area. The quarantine would then be lifted, and business would continue as usual.

For most parties involved in the issue, these measures provided an acceptable means of preventing medfly problems and, thus, allowed the continuation of the lucrative agricultural trade. Opposition, however, came from some public interest groups expressing deep concern over the potential hazards of using malathion. Nevertheless, industry interests prevailed and these methods were utilized, as policy makers seemed determined to take any steps possible to win a potential war against the medfly. Only time would tell if these measures would be sufficient to accomplish this ultimate goal.

First Contact

The medfly was first discovered in California during 1975 in Los Angeles. It is believed to have arrived due to the illegal entry of contaminated fruit. After the initial medfly detection, the problem quickly swelled into an infestation. California officials declared a state-of-emergency, and approximately 100 square miles of land were placed under quarantine. Under industry pressures, government agencies quickly initiated the state*****s first medfly eradication efforts. The program involved the release of approximately 600 million sterile male medflies and the heavy use of the pesticide malathion for ground spraying. Total costs of eradication were estimated at $1 million. Officials declared victory in August 1976, lifting the regional quarantine, ending extermination efforts, and finally announcing that the medfly had been officially eradicated from the state of California.

The California agriculture industry emerged mostly unscathed from the 1975 medfly infestation. The economic impact to producers was relatively minor, and the successful eradication efforts helped to establish government and market confidence that California could effectively address the medfly issue. As for the cost of the eradication efforts, this was paid for in joint cooperation between the state and federal governments. The industry paid nothing for the sterile medfly research and release program or the extensive pesticide treatments.

The 1980 Invasion

Following the initial infestation of 1975, California*****s agricultural community experienced several years of peace with regard to the medfly threat. However, this calm was not to last, and the state found itself faced with a major crisis at the start of the new decade. In 1980, medflies were detected in several counties, spanning a wide portion of the state. Monitors detected four adult flies and one medfly larva in Los Angeles. Officials responded with a declaration of a state-of-emergency, spelling the beginning of a new round of eradication efforts. These efforts consisted of the mass-release of sterile male medflies and the use of malathion in heavy ground spraying. Medflies were declared eradicated from Los Angeles in December of 1980.

Further north in California, the agriculture industry was, again, embroiled in a major struggle with the formidable pest. Hundreds of medflies were discovered over a wide range of territory. Eight counties, including Alameda, Contra Costa, Monterey, San Benito, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Joaquin and San Jose were affected. The discoveries resulted in officials placing a quarantine over the region, which eventually spanned approximately 530 square miles. Eradication efforts were greatly expanded in response to the crisis. Sterile male medflies were released by the millions, and the government initiated an extensive program of malathion spraying on the ground.

This time, however, the usual eradication efforts did not appear to be working. Monitoring traps continued to turn up medflies, much to the chagrin of domestic producers and state, federal, and foreign governments. It became clear that the crisis could escalate if more serious measures were not taken. California officials responded by establishing the California Medfly Project in June 1980. This was followed by the creation of the Technical Advisory Committee, made up of members of the scientific community who would assist in the anti-medfly program efforts. These officials and committee members would soon face a barrage of political pressures from all sides, as the medfly continued its assault on California agriculture.

By November 1980, the medfly problem in Northern California had not subsided in the least. California officials responded by initiating massive efforts to strip and destroy fruits and vegetables in the affected areas, as the industry began to show signs of severe panic. Domestic producers called for more aggressive measures to combat the medfly. Adding to the tribulations of the California agriculture industry, out-of-state importers expressed deep concern over the crisis. The Japanese government indicated that it was considering the implementation of import restrictions should California be unable to solve its medfly problem. Japanese officials indicated that they would be unwilling to accept the increased domestic risk of medfly contamination from imported California produce and would be obligated to take actions accordingly. California private industry parties and governing officials agreed that this could be the beginning of a chain reaction in which other foreign governments might impose severe trade restrictions on California*****s produce.

As California policy makers struggled with mounting foreign pressures, the U.S. federal government expressed its alarm over the crisis. On November 24, 1980 the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued its decision that the current medfly eradication efforts were insufficient and called for an unprecedented program of aerial spraying of malathion. A number of state governments had already begun to exert pressures on California industry members and policy makers, indicating that the future market for California exports to their states might look increasingly grim unless appropriate measures were taken. These states supported the USDA's resolution that aerial malathion spraying was in order.

On November 27, officials from the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) met with USDA officials to discuss the increasing tensions surrounding the medfly issue. The CDFA finally announced that it was seriously considering the implementation of an aerial spraying program over much of the quarantined area. This announcement met with staunch opposition from several city governments in the affected areas, as well as increased public interest group pressure. Members of the Technical Advisory Committee remained divided over the issue, while local governments voted to prohibit the aerial spraying program.

Faced with such a controversial decision, the CDFA agreed to postpone any aerial spraying and, instead, relied on the massive eradication efforts being conducted on the ground. Meanwhile, the California State Department of Health Services issued a report on the health issues surrounding the use of malathion. The report insisted that the pesticide was a safe and effective method for eradicating the medfly. This allayed some of the fears associated with the aerial spray program, as out-of-state pressures continued to mount over its implementation.

As 1980 came to a close, all of the parties involved waited to see if the medfly would survive the combination of the increased eradication measures and the approaching California winter. The fact that medflies cannot tolerate cold weather conditions led many scientists to speculate that the pest would not survive winter in California. However, the state is characterized by a highly desirable climate with comparatively temperate winters. As the medfly reemerged in the warmer months of 1981, it became evident that the insect could survive the less-than-brutal weather conditions in California. This discovery turned the medfly into an even greater threat, calling for effective eradication efforts to prevent it from becoming established in the state.

By July, the Technical Advisory Committee decided that aerial spraying of malathion might be a necessary step in the medfly eradication program, releasing their decision in an emergency meeting on July 7. The following day, the committee held talks with California Governor Edmund "Jerry" Brown, Jr., strongly encouraging him to initiate the controversial aerial spraying program. Faced with political pressures from all sides, Governor Brown delayed the decision and announced that the current ground based program would be intensified. This resulted in heated exchanges from all sides, as tensions mounted to their highest level since the beginning of the crisis.

The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) finally decided that more drastic measures were in order. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture John Block expressed the federal government*****s extreme dissatisfaction with CDFA medfly efforts, and issued the threat that, unless California initiated the malathion aerial spraying program immediately, the USDA would place a quarantine on the entire state. The announcement came on July 9, sending tremors throughout California. Less than a week later, the state governments of Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas threatened to impose unilateral quarantines on certain California produce. Other states followed, and California quickly found itself against a wall of quarantine restrictions which could cause considerable damage to the agricultural industry.

Shortly thereafter, foreign government officials claimed that they had seen enough as well. Both Japan and Mexico threatened to impose severe trade restrictions on much of California*****s produce exports. Japanese officials were adamant that the California eradication and internal quarantine procedures were unacceptable, and that unless the state could handle its medfly problem, the produce export industry to Japan would remain in extreme peril.

Thus, California officials conducted lengthy discussions over the possibility of intensified internal quarantine measures. In conjunction with the expressed concerns of the federal, state and foreign governments, CDFA officials engaged in extensive negotiations on expanding the medfly eradication program. In addition to the ground efforts, officials suggested a new set of guidelines involving both aerial pesticide spraying and post-harvest treatment of exported crops. The proposed post-harvest measures included mandatory produce fumigation treatments using one of two extremely potent pesticides, methyl bromide or ethylene dibromide. These pesticides had the advantage of being both penetrating and extremely lethal to any insect life in the produce. However, methyl bromide damaged some of the fumigated fruits and vegetables, reducing the market value of the crop. And although ethylene dibromide caused little damage to the fumigated produce, this pesticide*****s use was to be phased out by 1983.

Another element of the proposed post-harvest treatment program involved placing export produce into cold storage for up to ten days prior to preparation for shipping. This control method would prove particularly effective, as medflies would not be able to endure the extended periods of low temperature exposure. The drawbacks of such an approach would be the tremendous expense of constructing cold storage facilities to house all of the produce to be exported. Seasonal fluctuations in the amount of produce harvests created additional cost concerns. There would have to be ample storage to accommodate produce exports from the rich summer harvests, while many of the storage facilities would lie unused during the less productive periods. The extensive use of cold storage would involve both high initial production costs, and continuing maintenance and operation expenses.

Under the new proposed quarantine treatment procedures, all export crops would be submitted to both fumigation and cold storage prior to shipping to out-of-state destinations. This process would virtually eliminate the threat of inadvertently transporting medfly-infested produce across borders. However, some interest groups raised concerns as to the safety of the current and newly proposed plant quarantine program. Parties feared that the extensive use of malathion would not only inflict severe environmental damage, but could potentially render the food products unsafe. Coupled with the newly proposed use of the notoriously potent pesticides, methyl bromide and ethylene dibromide, critics suggested that these programs used to address the medfly problem might entail significant health risks. Thus, California officials were faced with the unique dilemma of how to satisfy the concerns of the domestic industry while simultaneously determining how to respond to the restrictive pressures from foreign governments and increasingly powerful interest groups.

Governor Brown was obligated to release his decision over the medfly issue on July 10, with the health of the California agriculture industry hanging in the balance. Public interest groups indicated that they would pursue measures to impeach the governor should he decide in favor of the aerial pesticide spraying program, while industry and government parties insisted that it was necessary to preserve the produce export market. As the medfly crisis intensified, the governor struggled to reach his all-important decision on how best to handle the political and economic dilemma.

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ENDNOTES

[i] CDFA

[ii] CDFA

[iii] CDFA

[iv] James Siebert and Vijay Pradhan, *****The Potential Impact of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly, Ceratitis Capitata (Wied.), Upon the Establishment in California: An Update*****, September 19, 1991, page 3

[v] Siebert and Pradhan, page 12

[vi] Siebert and Pradhan, page 18

[vii] Mark Wheeler, Discover, February 1993, page 44

[viii] Wheeler, page 45

[ix] Tom Abate, ***** Is the invading medfly eligible for California residency?***** Bioscience, January 1993, Vol. 43 (1), page 4

[x] James Carey, *****Establishment of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly in California*****, Science, 253, 1991, page 1369

[xi] Wheeler, page 5

End of case file.

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Teacher's Notes

Market Impact of an Embargo

The impact of the final determination of this case will be great no matter what the

ultimate solution is. There are definite political and economic consequences. This

section is meant as a further analysis of the impact of an embargo and how it would affect

not only the United States but Japan as well.

United States

The previous estimates of the economic impact of the medfly on California

agriculture considered the financial damage incurred through the infestation, the costs of

controlling the pest, and the expenses of the quarantine system. As Siebert and Pradhan

point out, another crucial question remains to be answered, however. What happens if

export markets are eliminated or decreased as a result of embargoes on California

agriculture? As it stands now, much of the state*****s exports are sent to Asia, an estimated

$429 million market.

The country of principal importance in the Pacific Rim area is Japan. Once

closed to imports, US agricultural exports have recently achieved tremendous success in

reaching the Japanese market. Many experts believe that as the economic powerhouse of

the region, Japan exerts a great deal of influence there. If Japan were to place an

embargo on fruit suspected of being contaminated by the medfly, then so would the other

countries in the area. If this market were lost, the impact on the agricultural sector of

California*****s economy would be costly.

In the short run, the effect would be a decrease in the sector*****s net revenue. This

loss, coupled with estimated increases in costs for the producers, would range from

$1.057 billion to $1.440 billion according to Siebert and Pradhan. The long-term impact

would likely be a smaller agricultural sector, either in size of farms or numbers of

growers. There would most likely be tremendous losses in acres harvested, assets, and

sales. An estimated 14,189 jobs would be lost. Ultimately, consumers would suffer. The

impact of determining the medfly to be a resident would probably result in higher prices,

decreased quality, and fewer choices.

Japan

The problem would be serious not only for the United States but for Japan as well. As a

country with limited productive land, Japan would have to search for alternative

providers that are not necessarily readily available. The problem would be intensified if

it failed to source out other foreign producers to provide the embargoed goods for its

domestic market.

While imports only account for approximately 5% of the Japanese produce market, the

U.S. accounts for almost half of that share. It is true that with the increasing competition

from Southeast Asian countries, Japan could most likely fill any void in its fresh-produce

imports should it impose an embargo. The critical element to consider, however, is

whether these countries could provide like-product substitutes for embargoed U.S. goods

or whether Japan would simply have to import alternative products.

The answer is a combination of the two. Japan could import significant amounts of

vegetables from other Asian countries, particularly China, Taiwan, and Thailand.

However, there are other products, such as citrus fruit, that would be difficult for these

countries to supply. A prime example is the importing of grapefruit. Japan has no

domestic grapefruit production and, therefore, is forced to import 100% of its supply.

The U.S. supplies more than 90% of Japan*****s imported grapefruit. Should Japan place an

embargo on citrus fruit from the U.S. as a result of the medfly, it would have to search for

alternative suppliers of this very important component of its fresh-produce import market.

This is a market share that the majority of Asian countries are not prepared to supply.

Japanese Perspective

This section is based on a telephone interview conducted on January 29, 1998 with the

Plant Trade Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and APHIS of the U.S. Agricultural

Trade Office (ATO) in Tokyo. The purpose of this section is to provide the present

circumstances of the medfly issue in Japan in order to stimulate students***** analytical

thinking.

The representative from the Plant Trade Division within the Ministry of

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery (MAFF) basically avoided answering questions

regarding MAFF*****s stance on the medfly controversy and the possibility of an embargo as

its ultimate solution. During the phone interview, the MAFF representative simply stated

that the transporting of the medfly into Japan is prohibited, and whether or not Japan

stops importing products from areas where medfly-outbreaks occur depends completely

on the U.S.*****s handling of the situation. MAFF, however, evaded further questions

regarding the ways in which Japanese actions depend on the U.S, and specifically

avoided discussing how the chosen methods of eradication of the pest or the severity of

an outbreak would affect Japanese decision-making.

The representative*****s unwillingness to answer the questions illustrates the

complexity of the issue of the medfly as well as that of trade relations between Japan and

the U.S. It is reasonable to believe that whatever actions MAFF takes as a result of the

medfly reports from the U.S. will be contingent on such factors as the eradication method

utilized and the economic circumstances in Japan at the time of the medfly outbreak.

APHIS at the U.S. Agricultural Trade Office (ATO) in Tokyo, on the other hand, had a

rather straightforward opinion regarding the delicate Japanese position and explained it

more frankly to us. According to APHIS, the medfly problem is not a new fear for the

Japanese at all, but it would become so with confirmation that the medfly is a permanent

resident. The ATO representative believes that there is very little chance that both the

USDA and MAFF will accept the theory of permanent residency due to their economic

co-interests. There is a definite economic co-dependence between Japan and the U.S.,

which drives its trade relationship. Therefore, rigid measures like an embargo would not

be an applicable or feasible instrument for Japan in the case of a medfly outbreak in the

U.S.

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Here is an example of a past paper to help in construction of the paper:

Thailand Food Forever

Case 1: Lowland-Upland Conflict in Thailand

There is a conflict in the highlands of Thailand between the Hmong-Thai highlanders, the lowlanders and the Thai Forestry Department. The Hmong-Thai highlanders are farming lychee trees and cabbage using slash and burn and chemically intensive methods that are causing soil erosion and water quality issues for the lowland farmers downstream. These Hmong-Thai plantations are also on state forest reserve land. The disagreement over issues has escalated into violent destruction of some of the highlander orchards and homes by the lowlanders with no intervention by the Thai government. The current conflict is centered in the Chom Thong district of Chaing Mai, but it is one of many such conflicts in the mountainous North of Thailand. This report will attempt to look at the facts of the conflict, who the decision makers are, their goals, the possible alternative solutions and opportunities for future monitoring for success.

Background

The Chiang Mai area of Thailand is a fertile region of mountains, valleys and rivers where, *****peoples from China , Laos , Myanmar ( Burma ) and Thailand have long traded goods and ideas in a fusion of cultures. This blend has been further enlivened by the presence of tribal societies *****“ such as the Hmong-Mien, Thai Lu and Phuan *****“ whose ethnic heritage knows no fixed political boundaries.***** (Cummings et. al, Lonely Planet Thailand, 2006, p. 273). The Chiang Mai province has more natural forest than any other province in the north (Cummings, p. 273).

The current conflict is centered in the Chom Thong district at the foot of the Doi Inthanon mountain range in the Chiang Mai province. This area has a rainy, tropical climate. The highlands and lowlands are linked not only geographically, but by water; the watershed extends from the highlands to the lowlands and the results of practices upstream literally flow downstream with the water.

Thai lowland farmers blame the farming practices of the Hmong hill tribes for their water shortages over the last 15 years, sediment in streams and flash floods during the rainy season. The highlanders have been cultivating cabbage crops by using slash and burn techniques to clear the forest and heavy use of chemicals to raise their crops. The loss of vegetation through the highlander clearing methods leaves the soil exposed to erosion which has resulted in sediment being washed downstream; the streams have become shallow with sediment build-ups washed down from the mountain. Many of the chemicals used in cabbage cultivation are believed to wash downstream and contaminate the lowland water supply (As the highlanders point out, though, the lowlanders also use chemicals in their farming). Hillslope management is important because the hillside is the watershed for the lowland area. This means that any changes to the landscape upstream directly affect the quality and availability of water downstream.

Lately, lowland farmers have raided the hilltribe orchards, cut down lychee trees and vandalized farms. Vandalized orchards were located in a national forest reserve. Lowland villagers accuse the Pa Klang Hmong of damaging the ***** forest, contaminating water sources and causing water shortages on their plantations. According to Thongbai Thongpao of the Bangkok Post (Thailand Class Packet, p. 11), *****the highlanders started lychee plantations at the instigation of government agencies over 30 years ago. Hmong-Thais later expanded their orchards into deteriorated forest and watershed areas in Pua and Nam Kon. Local administration and forestry officials did not object or give the Hmong-Thais any warning, regarding lychee trees as a good way to increase green areas in deforested areas.***** Several national laws, including the Wildlife Protection Act of 1992, give forestry staff the ability to turn farmland into state forest reserves and the Forestry Department has legal authority to evict settlers in the forest. The government has not been effective in helping to resolve the conflict. When some of the hilltribe villages were attacked the government did not respond; they have appeared to not be doing anything to solve the conflict. Both the lowland farmers and the hilltribe farmers want the government to show leadership by facilitating a solution. Those involved also want the government to take steps to improve the health of the forest which it appears they have not been doing.

Decision Makers

The conflict centers around three main groups from which representatives should be selected since they are in the position of being able to make decisions pertaining to a possible resolution: The lowland farmer leaders are directly involved and affected by the health of the forest and the watershed (for example, the head of the water district, water users and members of the Watershed and Environment Conservation Group of Chom Thong); the highland hilltribe leaders because they live in the controversial area, their farming actions directly impact the forest and watershed and they are directly affected by any decisions on how the forest will be managed and whether they will be able to continue to farm the area (for example, the Thai Hilltribesmen Foundation (THF), Samrit Thao of the Forest and Land Network in Pa Klang village, the Hilltribesmen Development Organisation and the village headman Noppandon Saengsongsiri); government officials and Forestry Service because they are the responsible representatives of the Thai people (which includes both groups), they hold legal power to evict land users in the forest and prosecute vandals, and are responsible for decisions affecting the health of public lands (for example, the district chief and the head of the Nan Forestry Office). Other groups who should most likely be at the table, but are not necessarily key decision makers, are conservation groups because they represent the interest of members of the public and can affect government policy (for example, Dhammanaat Foundation (p. 13) and Chom Thong Forest and Environmental Protection Group), members of use areas should also be at the table for discussion (Example - Prayong Dok-lamyai of the Water Basin Development Project of the North who could give insight into water use trends and availability), and groups such as the Regional Community Forestry Training Centre should be consulted since they could offer valuable discussion for farmer education programs.

Goals of Key Decision Makers

Lowlanders. The lowland farmers want to have a clean, reliable water supply to continue farming on their land; they want to see sustainable farming practices used in the highlands; they want year-round water; some want the Hmong removed from the forests; they want healthy forests since they also use the forest for resource extraction; and they want sustainability of their communities, quality of life and culture.

Highlanders. The hilltribe farmers want to be able to farm in peace and they want citizen rights which includes government protection; available farmland; sustainability of their farming systems, communities, quality of life and culture; and they also want the forest to be healthy.

Government Officials/Forestry Service. The government agencies want to increase and maintain forest biodiversity and integrity and it appears by their actions in the past that there could also be goals that are not completely altruistic such as payback or funding issues.

From articles consulted on the issues, it appears that there is a mutual desire of all key decision makers to conserve and repair the ecologically-sensitive ***** forest.

Alternatives

There are several alternatives to choose from:

* Get the key decision makers together to promote discussion and facilitate ownership in the final outcome.

* Improve communications.

* Define what is a healthy, biodiverse forest system.

* Provide farming education for alternative methods and sustainable practices including incorporating buffer areas between farming areas and water supply.

* Provide government funding for highlanders to restore the forests and help with forest protection.

* Provide government funding for highlanders to farm sustainably within forest lands.

* Review water use for the area and set standards for quality and monitoring.

* Create a system of land use permitting in forest area.

* Use pesticide use reporting.

* Implement land zoning *****“ designate areas for different crops and buffer areas.

* Ban all chemical use from the highlands.

* Ban all chemical use from the lowlands.

* The highlanders could change crops and cultivation methods to more sustainable methods that live in harmony with the forest (co-existence of man and forest).

* Evict the Hmong and other tribal people from the forest/rain catchment areas.

Evaluation of Alternatives

In light of the goals of each of the key decision makers:

* Get the key decision makers together to promote discussion and facilitate ownership in the final outcome.

o Lowlanders *****“ allows possible meeting of all goals

o Highlanders *****“ allows possible meeting of all goals

o Forestry/Government *****“ allows possible meeting of all goals.

* Improve communications.

o Lowlanders *****“ allows possible meeting of all goals

o Highlanders *****“ allows possible meeting of all goals

o Forestry/Government - allows possible meeting of all goals

* Define what is a healthy, biodiverse forest system.

o Lowlanders *****“ allows for better communication which will facilitate goals.

o Highlanders *****“ allows for better communication which will facilitate goals.

o Forestry/Government *****“ allows for better communication which will facilitate goals being met.

* Provide farming education for alternative methods and sustainable practices including incorporating buffer areas between farming areas and water supply.

o Lowlanders *****“ could improve forest health and meet all goals except Hmong removal.

o Highlanders *****“ could meet all goals but may require a change in culture through new methods.

o Forestry/Government *****“ if the Hmong continue to farm in the forest, then this could help to meet the goal of biodiversity and forest health. This could add to funding needs.

* Provide government funding for highlanders to restore the forests and help with forest protection.

o Lowlanders *****“ could help to meet all goals except for Hmong removal.

o Highlanders *****“ could help to meet all goals, but may require a change in culture through new ideas.

o Forestry/Government - Could meet goals of biodiversity and forest health, but may add to funding needs.

* Provide government funding for highlanders to farm sustainably within forest lands.

o Lowlanders *****“ Could meet all goals except for Hmong removal.

o Highlanders *****“ Could meet all goals, but may require change in methods and culture to do things differently.

o Forestry/Government *****“ Could meet goals of biodiversity and forest health, but may add to funding needs.

* Review water use for the area and set standards for quality and monitoring.

o Lowlanders *****“ Could meet all goals.

o Highlanders *****“ Could meet goals for sustainability and healthy forests.

o Forestry/Government - Could meet goals of biodiversity and forest health, but may add to funding needs.

* Create a system of land use permitting in forest area.

o Lowlanders *****“ Could meet all goals except for removal of Hmong.

o Highlanders *****“ Could meet all goals but may restrict availability of additional areas for farming.

o Forestry/Government - Could meet goals of biodiversity and forest health, but may add to funding needs.

* Use pesticide use reporting.

o Lowlanders *****“ Could meet all goals except Hmong removal.

o Highlanders *****“ Could meet goals of forest health and sustainability.

o Forestry/Government - Could meet goals of biodiversity and forest health, but may add to funding needs.

* Implement land zoning *****“ designate areas for different crops and buffer areas.

o Lowlanders *****“ Could meet all goals, but may affect land use on lowlands as well.

o Highlanders *****“ Could meet goals of sustainability and forest health.

o Forestry/Government - Could meet goals of biodiversity and forest health, but may add to funding needs for enforcement.

* Ban all chemical use from the highlands.

o Lowlanders *****“ Could meet all goals except Hmong removal.

o Highlanders *****“ Could meet all goals.

o Forestry/Government - Could meet goals of biodiversity and forest health, but may add to funding needs for enforcement.

* Ban all chemical use from the lowlands.

o Lowlanders *****“ Could help meet goal of water quality and sustainability, but may change culture through new methods.

o Highlanders *****“ Would not affect goals.

o Forestry/Government *****“ Would not affect goals of forest health, but may add to funding needs for enforcement.

* The highlanders could change crops and cultivation methods to more sustainable methods that live in harmony with the forest (co-existence of man and forest).

o Lowlanders *****“ Could meet all goals except removal of Hmong.

o Highlanders *****“ Could meet all goals, but may require a change of culture through different methods and crops.

o Forestry/Government *****“ Could meet all goals.

* Evict the Hmong and other tribal people from the forest/rain catchment areas.

o Lowlanders *****“ Would meet goal of Hmong removal.

o Highlanders *****“ Would not meet goals.

o Forestry/Government *****“ Would not meet goals and may add to funding needs.

Viable solutions from the above evaluations include:

From the evaluation process it appears that the logical first step would be to improve communication through bringing the key decision makers together in order to promote discussion and facilitate ownership in the final outcome; through this process it can be agreed upon what is a healthy, biodiverse forest system and water use and quality can be reviewed and values agreed to. In phase two, once base values are agreed upon, it may be possible to move into more action-***** programs such as providing farming education for alternative methods and sustainable practices including incorporating buffer areas between farming areas and water supply (both high- and lowland), restricted pesticide use (based on water quality guidelines and forest health standards), zoning areas, buffers and sustainable farming methods based on biodiversity and sustainability definitions agreed to. The need for land use permitting, pesticide use permitting and chemical banning can be determined through the initial discussions which set baselines (would not be recommended as first phase since they do not meet all goals for all stakeholders through immediate implementation). In the short-term, evicting the Hmong does not meet the goals of any of the decision makers for biodiversity or sustainability and it would most likely be more productive to complete the first phase of communication before a decision was made as to how to handle land use agreements, eviction and/or changes in farming techniques by the Hmong.

Monitoring

It will be very important to monitor any changes in methods or policy in order to measure for success. Through the first phase of communication, baseline numbers for current biodiversity of the forest in farmed and non-farmed areas, water use, water quality, chemical use, productivity (number of families supported, crop yields per area, etc.), and assessments of current methods and sustainability should be taken. Following these initial measurements, measurements should be taken at least each season. If government regulations such as permitting, zoning or evictions are implemented, they should be followed for compliance on an annual basis. An assessment of social conflict or harmony should be taken through a continuation of the communication started initially by the meeting of the committee of key decision makers.

Conclusion

There is a conflict in the highlands of Thailand between the Hmong-Thai highlanders, the lowlanders and the Thai Forestry Department. The Hmong-Thai highlanders are farming lychee trees and cabbage using slash and burn and chemically intensive methods that are causing soil erosion and water quality issues for the lowland farmers downstream. These Hmong-Thai plantations are also on state forest reserve land. The disagreement over issues has escalated into violent destruction of some of the highlander orchards and homes by the lowlanders with no intervention by the Thai government. The current conflict is centered in the Chom Thong district of Chaing Mai, but it is one of many such conflicts in the mountainous North of Thailand. The evaluation of key decision makers, goals of each decision maker, alternatives and monitoring suggests that there are alternatives that have the potential to alleviate the conflicts between the key decision makers and accomplish their goals. Through communication, definition of common standards, implementation of programs, policies and education followed by monitoring it may be possible for both the lowlanders and highlanders to farm in peace, water quality to be improved, and the forest biodiversity to be improved and maintained. This area of the Chiang Mai district could then be a model of a solution for other areas of Thailand dealing with similar conflicts.